

Approved For Release 2008/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500840093-4
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CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 194278

25X1

COUNTRY Poland

DATE DISTR 5 December 1947

SUBJECT PPR's Views on the International Situation

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED 25X1

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED 25X1

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

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Trends in International Relations

1. The Central Committee of the PPR (KC PPR) believes that the following trends are apparent in international relations:
 - (a) Increased armaments.
 - (b) Loosening of diplomatic contacts between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxons.
 - (c) Lack of frankness on the part of the Anglo-Saxons in their dealings with the USSR.
 - (d) Use of economic pressure by the US.
 - (e) Reconstruction of Germany by the US and Great Britain. The USSR, at the same time, is determined that capitalistic Anglo-Saxon efforts to preserve imperialistic Germany must be defeated. Germany must be disarmed, exploited, and communized. In official conversations with German Communists and the Free Germany Committee, the Soviets stress Bismark's traditional wish to co-operate with Russia.
 - (f) Strengthening of the USSR's international position.
 - (g) Weakening of the "imperialistic camp." This weakening is caused, in part, by the struggles for freedom and independence which are in progress in Indonesia, China, Egypt, Greece, and the Arab world. The USSR will develop and exploit this weakening factor by inciting strife between colonies and their mother countries. Also undermining the "imperialistic camp" is the growing animosity between Great Britain and the US resulting from the US appetite for expansion. The USSR will try to widen this breach between Great Britain and the US by promoting discord between them whenever possible. The PPR, in stressing US imperialism, states that "England, the second great imperialistic power, is in its decline. The conviction is growing among the British masses that the nation must choose one of two ways: change her foreign policy and align herself with the USSR and the democratic countries, or adhere to her decrepit colonial policy and eventually become an appendix of the US."

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(h) Strengthening of the anti-imperialistic camp.

- P. The KC PPR, at its April meeting, voted the following thesis: "Two years after the end of the war the fight between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists in the world is still raging. The stake in this fight is whether the future world will be built on the unsteady foundation of the weak states being overruled by the strong ones, or whether the peace will be built on a strong foundation of equal rights for all nations, big or small."

Rejection of Marshall Plan

2. According to the PPR, the following factors are responsible for the rejection of the Marshall Plan by the USSR and her satellites:
- (a) The USSR regards US capital investment in eastern Europe as a bid for domination in that area.
 - (b) The USSR views the Plan as an attempt to weaken the USSR's position in eastern Europe, menace her security there, and eventually eliminate her political influence entirely.
 - (c) The USSR has her own plan for organizing eastern Europe.

USSR's Plan for Eastern Europe

4. The USSR plan envisages the creation in eastern Europe of a united, interlocked, and economically complementary region in which the economic gap made by the elimination of Germany will be filled by balancing the industrial areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia against the raw material centers. The USSR wants to exploit the Dnieper-Vistula canal project and the Danubian bridges which are the shortest and cheapest arteries of communication between the elements of her proposed bloc. By doing this she can develop the Baltic-Black Sea-Mediterranean flatland, unite them with Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic States, and weld the whole with eastern USSR as a unit. Once this phase is accomplished and the USSR is firmly entrenched in the Balkans, she can then close the road to the East and turn her attention to the Mediterranean with a view to expanding into Africa.
5. The chief tools by which Stalin can implement his strategic plan are:
- (a) Tying the eastern European countries to the USSR economically.
 - (b) Helping these countries in their trade with the USSR and with each other.
 - (c) Laying a strong foundation for Soviet military strategy.
 - (d) Eliminating the Anglo-Saxons' influence and preventing their penetration to the Rhine and the Danube.
6. Poland, according to the KC PPR, has a favored place in the USSR's economic plan for Europe, and her economic and political planning is therefore closely coordinated with Moscow. The exact character of this "key role" is undetermined. A leading member of the PPR stated that Poland's ultimate role in the all-Soviet system will depend upon the international situation. He added: "One thing is clear; the Silesian coal basin is the most precious region in central Europe. It is a potent asset for the Slav states, and its possession places Poland in a dominant position second only to the USSR."
7. The USSR makes her actual plans by talking of a Slav bloc. This does not, however, prevent her absorption and communization of such non-Slavic states as Hungary, Rumania, and eastern Germany.
8. The BP PPR stresses the following dominant elements in the USSR's diplomacy which have helped her to emerge from World War II holding half of Europe:
- (a) Her avoidance of risky enterprises and undue provocation.
 - (b) The systematic achievement of her own program.

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